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This paper aims to identify the effect of political exclusion on social capital in Colombia, 
suggesting social capital as an important channel through which political inequality has been 
central for Colombian economic development. I use the Colombian National Front agreement 
during 1958-1974 to test my hypothesis, as it institutionalized the political exclusion of non-
traditional parties in that country. Whereas it affected all regions at the same time, it implied 
differential effects according to the municipalities’ initial political diversity. The empirical 
strategy deals with the potential endogeneity in the variation of the treatment by using region 
fixed effects and relevant control variables in a cross-section model, as well as performing 
robustness checks. I further use panel fixed effects models with electoral turnout as a measure 
of social capital. I find that political exclusion imposed by the National Front may have led to 
less trusting individuals today, to a higher perception of free riding behaviors and to lower 
levels of electoral turnout. I also find that a possible channel through which political exclusion 
in the past may be able to explain social capital in the present is distrust towards the state. 
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      Introduction 
 
         Institutions and social capital are considered in the literature as causes of differences in 
economic development across countries. They are highly persistent over time, but the 
channels through which they persist and affect economic development have not been 
extensively tested. The aim of this paper is to identify the impact of political inequality on 
social capital in Colombia. With political inequality (or political exclusion) I refer to the 
extent to which political institutions do not equally allow groups to access political power. I 
hypothesize that political exclusion in Colombia has damaged generalized trust and induced 
free-riding behaviors. This would mean that political inequality has not only affected 
economic development in the usual ways claimed in the literature, for example, through the 
establishment of economic institutions that favor the elites, but also that political inequality 
may have affected economic development through the damage of social capital. The latter 
supports the idea that formal institutions have a broader effect on society that is also 
important for economic development and for their own persistence.  
The way I test this hypothesis is by using an important event for the Colombian political 
system in the 1950’s: The National Front agreement. The National Front institutionalized the 
dominance of the two traditional parties, Liberal and Conservative. According to it, these 
parties had to alternate the presidency every four years during the period 1958-1974, while 
maintaining half share of all executive branch offices, as well as legislative, judicial and 
bureaucratic positions in each presidential period. The National Front not only imposed a 
formal barrier to political participation, but it notably increased clientelism as suggested by 
qualitative evidence. The literature also claims that there was an increasing distrust in 
government, elections and democracy after the National Front. 
Political inequality, as a result of the National Front, did not affect regions in Colombia 
equally. Regions with a stronger preference for parties other than the Liberal and 
Conservative should have experienced a higher political exclusion than those that only had a 
traditional political affiliation.  I thus investigate the relationship between the intensity of the 
National Front treatment, as measured by the mean electoral share of non-traditional parties 
before the National Front, and various measures of social capital.  
I use survey measures from the Social Capital Barometer for Colombia -Barcas – in 2011. 
Since variation in the political exclusion treatment (preference for non-traditional parties 
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before the National Front) might be related with social capital in the past or with some other 
factors that determine social capital today, I deal with this potential endogeneity in the 
empirical strategy. Whereas the basic identification strategy is based on relevant control 
variables and region fixed effects, I further perform robustness checks to verify my results. I 
also estimate panel fixed effects models using electoral turnout as an additional measure of 
social capital. 
I find that a larger political exclusion treatment (electoral share of non-traditional parties at 
the municipality level before the National Front) is associated with less trusting individuals 
today and with a higher perception of free riding behaviors. Using the same measure of the 
treatment today as a placebo yields no significant effects (if any, only positive), while the 
treatment is equally significant, also similar in magnitude, when including both. However, I 
further try to control for past social capital by using mean electoral turnout before the 
National Front as a proxy. After controlling for past social capital with this proxy, a higher 
treatment is still significantly related to a higher perception of free riding behaviors. Results 
are robust when performing regressions weighted by the share of non-immigrants in each 
municipality and when using a smaller, more homogeneous sample of municipalities.  
I also find additional evidence of a deterioration of social capital. After controlling for 
department fixed effects and time fixed effects, departments affected by a higher political 
exclusion have, on average, a lower electoral turnout for all the period after the National 
Front and this negative association is only significant for years after the treatment.  
The intuition behind the hypothesis in this study is that political exclusion creates distrust 
towards the state, which then harms social capital. To the extent that abstentionism reflects 
distrust towards the state, results for electoral turnout support this channel: Departments 
facing a larger political exclusion due to the National Front would be the ones with lower 
levels of trust towards the state after the treatment. I further investigate the proposed 
channel using survey measures of state perception today. I find that a higher National Front 
treatment is in general associated with a higher perception that state’s decisions are not 
equally applied to everybody, and this, in turn, is associated with a higher perception of free-
riding behaviors. Corruption perception in public offices is significantly related with less 
trusting individuals and with a higher perception of free-riding behaviors; however, this 
corruption measure is not clearly affected by the treatment.  
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Although these results may be some evidence in favor of distrust towards the state as a 
channel, there might be additional channels through which the treatment is also operating. 
This is clear in that the National Front treatment still matters for social capital in most cases, 
even after controlling for the suggested channel. Alternatively, one may think that state 
perception today does not necessarily coincide with state perception in the past (during and 
after the treatment), which is the one argued to have undermined social capital. 
Extensive literature has claimed institutions as the major cause of differences in development 
outcomes, not only explaining the unprecedented economic growth after 18001, but also the 
present underdevelopment of many countries.2 The question is still how institutions are 
determined and why are they still different across countries. In this sense, the literature has 
given a fundamental role to political power. It is argued that the evolution of political power 
reinforces particular initial conditions and its distribution determines economic institutions 
(Acemoglu et al., 2005b).  
Empirical literature on Colombian development identifies political inequality as a major 
cause of underdevelopment. Acemoglu et al. (2007) find for the Colombian region of 
Cundinamarca that political rather than economic inequality in the 19th century is 
significantly related with underdevelopment paths among municipalities. Indeed, 
municipalities that were more economically unequal are more developed today. This latter 
outcome is also found for other Latin American countries.3  
Accordingly, historical and theoretical literature also claims that political inequality is central 
to explain Colombia’s economic development. Robinson (2005) suggests, for instance, that 
the incoherence of Colombia’s poor development outcomes with its long history of economic 
stability and excellent macroeconomic policy can be explained by the persistence of political 
elites and traditional parties.  
On the other hand, there is extensive literature that would claim an important role for social 
capital in the Colombian context, although the determinants and effects of social capital have 
not been tested in that country to the best of my knowledge. 
Social capital is considered to have a direct impact on economic development since it 
establishes the degree of cooperation and mutual trust among individuals, which are key 
                                                          
1North and Thomas (1970); North and Weingast (1989); Acemoglu et al. (2005a); La Porta et al. (2008); Acemoglu 
et al. (2011). 
2Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002); Acemoglu et al. (2001); Acemoglu et al. (2002); Banerjee and Iyer (2005); 
Nunn, (2008); Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009); Dell (2010). 
3 Dell (2010). 
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elements for the development of markets, for solving collective problems, and thus for public 
goods provision. Social capital may also matter indirectly by influencing formal institutions 
and their performance. Several studies4 have reported a positive and significant relationship 
between social capital and development outcomes across and within countries (arguably 
causal). Considerable literature has also shown a significant association between social 
capital and institutional outcomes5 and has searched for the historical origins of social capital 
differences6.  
Literature on social capital often casts doubts on the dominance of formal institutions in 
determining economic growth and claims that culture has been severely understated. The 
main fact it brings into question is that same formal institutions can perform differently in 
different cultural environments, where also different economic outcomes are observed 
(Tabellini, 2010), although this relationship does not necessarily mean a causal effect of 
culture on institutions performance or economic development. Additionally, this literature 
points out the need to understand the way cultural values are formed and transmitted over 
time.  
This study provides the following intuition: Political inequality creates in the first place 
distrust towards the state; citizens may not agree with, nor trust the use and destination of 
public resources and they may not believe, in general, that governmental policies will be 
socially optimal. If everyone has to fend for oneself because the state is not trustworthy to 
represent the society’s interests, a greater sense of individualism or selfishness is likely 
induced, and this becomes common knowledge so that everybody is in a non-cooperative 
equilibrium. This intuition implies that the interplay between citizens and state under 
political inequality probably causes a broader effect that spreads out free riding and distrust 
to culture as a whole.7 Like the papers by Jacob and Tyrell (2010) and Nunn and Wantchekon 
(2011), this paper shows a case of social capital erosion. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I give a brief historical background of the 
Colombian National Front. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents the empirical 
                                                          
4 Putnam et al. (1993); Helliwell and Putnam (1995); Fukuyama (1996); Knack and Keefer (1997); Guiso et al. 
(2004); Algan and Cahuc (2007). 
5 Putnam et al. (1993); Fukuyama (1996); La Porta et al. (1997); Knack (2002); Uslaner (2006). 
6 Putnam (1993); Guiso et al. (2008); Tabellini, (2010); Nunn and Wantchekon (2011); Durante (2010); Jacob and 
Tyrell (2010). 
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 When I argue that political inequality affects social capital, I do not refer to attitudes that appear as a direct 
outcome of institutions-driven incentives; for example, that there are less entrepreneurs because property rights 
are not well protected, or that people cheat on taxes because law enforcement is weak. I refer to an effect on every 
day behaviors. 
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strategy. In section 4 I report results. Section 5 investigates the proposed channel in the 
hypothesis. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
1. The Colombian National Front  
 
The economic development of Colombia seems to be contradictory, as highlighted by 
Robinson (2005). He notes that Colombia, while being a country with a history of good 
macroeconomic policy, has very disappointing socio-economic outcomes, just as those of any 
other Latin American country.   
Unlike the rest of countries in Latin America, Colombia’s economic performance during the 
20th century has shown a very low volatility. A prudent macroeconomic policy has avoided 
inflation problems and debt crisis, whereas they have been a major source of instability for 
countries in the region. Colombia has been also unique in the continuity of its political elites 
and traditional parties since their foundation in the 1840s (Robinson, 2005). 
One reason for a prudent macroeconomic policy might be that persistent elites that receive a 
high share of national income and seek to maximize the value of their rents are willing to 
carry out appropriate macroeconomic policies. The question posed by Robinson (2005) is: 
how can this persistence of elites be explained without satisfying social improvements and 
without recurring to populism? And the answer comes from large literature that points out 
clientelism as an outstanding feature of Colombian politics.8 Robinson (2005), in particular, 
argues that “Colombian elites have long-developed social networks and specific investments 
in delivering patronage” (Robinson, 2005, p. 11) and as a consequence, clientelism has 
become increasingly efficient as a means of maintaining control of the political system 
(Robinson, 2005).  
One chapter in the continuity of political elites in Colombia is given by the National Front 
agreement –El Frente Nacional (hereafter NF). This agreement institutionalized the exclusive 
dominance of the two traditional parties, Liberals and Conservatives, for the period 1958-
1974. Liberals and Conservatives had to alternate the presidency every four years during that 
period, while maintaining half share of all executive branch offices, as well as legislative, 
                                                          
8 Duarte (2003), Martz (1997), Carey and Shugart (1995), Leal and Davila (1990), Diaz (1986), Losada (1984), 
Schmidt (1977). 
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judicial and bureaucratic positions in each presidential period.9 The NF was a key element 
for policy makers to achieve a long run perspective in economic policy (Hartlyn, 1988; 
Cárdenas, 2009), but also for the rise of clientelism according to qualitative historical 
evidence. 
1.1. Emergence and consequences of the National Front 
The NF emerged as a way to stop violence at that time and as an urgent measure conceived 
by the political elites, who feared to be excluded from power during the military government 
of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla. Before the NF, Liberals and Conservatives had always 
fought against each other for holding control over the state and public offices. Precisely 
during the decade before (period called La Violencia), Colombia experienced great violence as 
a result of an increased political polarization between these parties; this started with the 
presidential elections in 1946. Although Liberals were a majority at that moment, a fracture 
within this party allowed a minority of Conservatives to win the presidency, and this was 
the trigger for a civil war (Hartlyn, 1984). Violence became even worse after the assassination 
in 1948 of the Liberal populist leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, who was a main figure in the 
political context. This period of chaos was ruled by two conservative governments until the 
overthrow by General Rojas Pinilla in 1953.10  
Although Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957) came to power with support of sectors from both parties, 
his government distanced these political actors, wide sectors of the population and main 
economic players. Corruption, violence and populist policies, on the one hand, and Rojas 
Pinilla’s desire to stay in power, on the other, were the causes of an increased opposition that 
derived in the NF agreement. Rojas’ attempts to stop the elites’ NF led to a generalized strike 
promoted by bankers, industrialists and merchants, which made Rojas finally withdraw in 
1957 (Hartlyn, 1984). The NF was signed in 1957 and the first presidency started in 1958 with 
a Liberal candidate.  
The NF eliminated indeed conflicts among the two traditional parties and encouraged 
cooperation between them, while they were becoming more similar over time (Melo, 1978; 
                                                          
9 Power parity between the two traditional parties remained even beyond the period of the NF thanks to a 
constitutional reform made in 1968. According to it, Conservatives and Liberals should share administrative posts 
until 1978, although free electoral competition for presidency would return in 1974; moreover, after 1978, the 
winning party should cede some power to the second one, which was the case until 1986 (Pizarro, 2004).  
10 This event was the result of the intensified violence under the government period 1950-1953 and the conspiracy 
of Conservative leaders with the military (Hartlyn, 1984).  
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Acevedo and Castaño, 2002). The NF implied institutional stability, but political leaders did 
not take advantage of it in order to gain real democratic support. For instance, although 
some social reforms were proposed during that period, they were not fully executed or not 
even undertaken and were just credible as attempts to legitimizing an exclusive and unfair 
political system (Melo, 1978; Acevedo and Castaño, 2002). Accordingly, Hartlyn (1984; 1988) 
points out the marginalization of the common people from policymaking: “[The National 
Front] promoted the defense of organized minority rights over majority rights, thwarted 
reform, and produced governments with strong immobilist tendencies” (Hartlyn, 1984, p. 
247).  
One important effect attributed to the NF was increased clientelism. As the NF promoted 
intraparty competition, not competition across parties, the NF produced fragmentation 
within parties (Pizarro, 2004). Members of a same party had to compete for the presidency, 
as well as for the share of bureaucratic quotas. This fragmentation was likely to increase 
clientelism due to the increasing need of support outside the own party (Pizarro, 2004), and 
due to the obstacles to governance faced by the executive11.  On the other hand, following the 
hypothesis of Robinson (2005), it can be argued that the NF gave the traditional parties the 
time and space to build the necessary networks in order to keep power easily through 
clientelism. 
One salient fact during the NF was the emergence of illegal armed groups, some of which 
persist until these days. Hence, while the NF eliminated violence between traditional parties, 
it induced another form of violence as a response to political exclusion (Acevedo and 
Castaño, 2002; Pizarro, 2004).  
While the emergence of these armed groups is important evidence that the NF represented a 
political shock, the latter probably had other less visible, but no less relevant, effects. The 
literature clearly identifies an increasing distrust in elections and democracy and thus a rise 
in abstentionism during the period of the NF (Acevedo-Castaño, 2002). There was a feeling 
that electoral results were predetermined (Tirado, 1989); on the other hand, as Liberals and 
Conservatives were turning more ideologically equal, they could not offer distinguishable 
options to the citizens (Melo, 1978). As Melo (1978) points out, rising abstentionism was even 
resistant to processes like the growth of urban population, the increase in the literacy and 
numeracy rate, as well as the improvement of media. It is then argued that the linkages 
                                                          
11 The NF agreement also established a mandatory two-thirds majority vote in the Congress until 1968 (Hartlyn, 
1984). 
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between parties and citizens turned more dependent on the provision of private benefits 
(Melo, 1978). 
1.2. Variation in the magnitude of the National Front impact  
The NF agreement imposed a formal barrier to political participation and may have 
increased clientelism as a consequence of intraparty competition, political exclusion, and the 
absence of an opposition control, which made clientelistic networks easier to build. Although 
this agreement was valid in the whole country, the magnitude of its impact was not likely 
equal across regions. Some regions were more politically diverse than others before the NF, 
or in other words, some regions had a stronger preference for parties other than the Liberal 
and Conservative and, as a consequence, these regions experienced a higher political 
exclusion.  
Non-traditional parties in the first half of the twentieth century were already facing high 
entry barriers to the political system, and therefore many of these third parties did not have 
continuity in the political scene. The only exception was the Communist party (Pizarro, 
1997); it was founded in 1930 and its main support came from previous farmers and laborers’ 
political movements grouped into the former Socialist party (Medina, 1989). 
Graph 1 shows a map of Colombia locating the 57 municipalities in the sample; it displays 
differences in their mean electoral share of non-traditional parties before the NF.12 As can be 
seen, preference for non-traditional parties in the sample is fairly well spread across 
departments. Graph 2, in turn, shows mean electoral share of non-traditional parties before 
the NF at the department level. Now some regions (areas including more than one 
department)13 look more homogeneous than others; for instance, the Pacific-north region 
with a high mean electoral share of non-traditional parties, and the south-west region, which 
exhibits in contrast a very low share. Also homogeneous is the ‘Viejo Caldas’ – Antioquia 
region, whereas the Atlantic coast, the central region of the country and the ‘Santanderes’ 
(Santander and Norte de Santander departments) display more heterogeneity. 
The variation observed in these graphs is used in this paper in order to measure the effect of 
political exclusion on social capital in a within-country setting. The conditions for 
identification of such effect will be discussed in the empirical strategy. 
                                                          
12 Graph A1 (in the Appendix) indicates municipalities with a mean electoral share of non-traditional parties 
before the NF higher than 1% in order to ease the observation of ‘treated’ municipalities according to this 
threshold. 
13 These regions are bordered with a thicker line in the graphs. 
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2. Data description 
 
2.1 Social capital and state perception data 
I use the Colombian social capital survey - Barcas - for the year 2011 in order to obtain 
measures of interest. Barcas is the source used by the World Values Survey and has a 
representative sample of individuals from 57 Colombian municipalities, 26 of which are 
departments´ capital cities.14 It surveys a total of 3028 individuals.   
Social capital outcomes are based on the following questions: 1) Generally speaking would 
you say most people can be trusted, or one cannot be that trusting when dealing with 
people?; 2) Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a 
chance, or would they try to be fair?  With the first question I want to measure generalized 
trust; I then define the variable trust. With the second question I measure perception of free 
riding behaviors, and based on it I define the variable fair. Although the Barcas survey also 
provides questions on the extent to which individuals accept free riding behavior (or are free 
riders), these questions are subject to be dishonestly answered as these kinds of behavior 
should not be socially acceptable.  Yet, some literature based on experimental data has 
pointed out that people’s statements about the behavior of others may reflect to some extent 
how they behave themselves (Glaeser et al., 2000). The variables trust and fair will be used as 
the dependent variables in the empirical strategy.15 
The Barcas survey also allows observing some individuals’ characteristics that I would like to 
control for.  I can observe if the individual considers himself as belonging to an ethnic/racial 
group, namely, black or indigenous. I also identify if the individual has been a victim of the 
armed conflict in Colombia, by considering positive answers in any of the following three 
questions: Have you lost any member of your family or close relative because of the armed 
conflict? Has any member of your family, or have you had to take refuge or to leave your 
home because of the armed conflict? Has any member of your family had to leave the 
country because of the armed conflict? 
Some questions in the Barcas survey are related to distrust towards the state, which is the 
suggested channel in this study. I construct a corruption variable based on the reported 
                                                          
14 Given that a significant part of the regions’ population is concentrated in capital cities, total population of the 57 
municipalities in the sample would account for 46% of the country population. 
15 Mean values of trust and fair in each municipality are shown in the Colombian map in Graph A2 and Graph A3, 
respectively. 
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corruption perception in public offices; I also construct the variable all_equal, which indicates 
the extent to which individuals believe that state’s decisions are not applied equally to 
everybody. 
2.2. Electoral data 
The Colombian national electoral office (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil) is the source 
for electoral data. Variables of interest are electoral share of non-traditional parties, defined 
as the share of votes for non-traditional parties in total votes for a given elections, and 
electoral turnout, defined as total number of votes over electoral potential (individuals able 
to vote).  
Electoral reports were directly consulted for electoral share of non-traditional parties and 
electoral turnout at the municipal level before 1958. Some (10) municipalities in the Barcas 
survey did not exist before 1958 (were not recognized as municipalities given their small 
size). In these cases, electoral share of non-traditional parties before the NF was established 
for them as being zero, given that this share was either zero for the whole department, or if 
positive, it was an existent municipality today the one reporting this positive share within 
the department.  
On the other hand, electoral share of non-traditional parties after 2000 is calculated with 
databases provided by Universidad de los Andes, and electoral turnout at the department 
level was consulted at the Electoral Processes Observatory - Universidad del Rosario. 
2.3. Socio-economic data for municipalities 
I use two Colombian Censuses in order to construct socio-economic variables at the 
municipality level. One Census is the one closest before the treatment in 1951; the second 
Census in 2005 is the one closest to social capital outcomes. These variables are described in 
Table A7 and Table 1. 
For municipalities in the Barcas survey that did not exist in 1951, I have to assume 
department´s averages for some variables and estimate their population in that year 
according to population growth rates.  An important problem faced with the 1951 Census is 
heterogeneity in the type of information available for all municipalities. This restricts the 
number covariates I can construct. 
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2.4. Descriptive statistics 
All variables presented above are defined in Table A7 in the Appendix and descriptive 
statistics of them are shown in Table 1. Municipalities are divided into treatment and control 
group in Table 1 using a binary treatment, which takes the value of one if mean electoral 
share of non-traditional parties in 1941-1951 is higher than one percent. The comparison of 
covariates by treatment status is further discussed in section 3.2 below. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
 
       The empirical strategy pursues the identification of a causal effect of political exclusion 
on social capital in Colombia. I have argued that the National Front –NF- implied a major 
shock as it institutionalized political exclusion of non-traditional parties; moreover, I claim 
there was variation in its impact, considering the extent to which individuals identified with 
those parties excluded from the political system.  
The employed measure for political exclusion treatment is thus the mean electoral share of 
non-traditional parties in each municipality before the NF, more precisely, during the period 
1941-195116 (political_exclusion). The main issue of concern is, however, that the variation in 
the treatment may not be exogenous for social capital; electoral share of non-traditional 
parties might be related with social capital in the past or with some other factors that 
determine social capital today.  
In the following subsections I will present the baseline model (which uses social capital 
outcomes from the Barcas survey), the conditions for identification of a causal effect, and 
finally, a panel approach using an alternative measure of social capital. 
3.1. Baseline model 
The baseline model is given by equation (1), where social capital outcomes at the individual 
level are a function of region fixed effects, treatment and control variables.  
                                                               
         
                  (1) 
Index i denotes individuals in the sample, whereas index j refers to the corresponding 
municipality for individual i.  Social Capital Outcome is either the variable trust  or fair.     are 
                                                          
16 This period corresponds to 6 legislative elections before the NF. See Table A7 for a more precise definition. 
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region fixed effects. These Colombian regions are wider than departments and can be clearly 
identified in that country, since cultural and economic characteristics are similar within 
them, and also different from these characteristics in other regions. Municipalities in the 
sample can be classified into six regions, which were already mentioned in section 1.2.17  
Department fixed effects would be preferable, but for some departments I do not have more 
than one municipality in the sample and hence they would capture the treatment. X is a 
vector of individual controls; Z is a vector of control variables at the municipality level.  
Since the political exclusion treatment is defined at the municipality level, I also estimate the 
baseline model considering mean social capital outcomes in each municipality. By doing so, I 
am restricting the sample to 57 observations, which makes hypotheses tests more 
demanding.  
3.2. Conditions for identification 
The empirical setting above uses the NF event in order to measure a political exclusion 
treatment. This can be understood as a quasi-experimental setting if the following conditions 
hold.  
First, individuals should be comparable among treated and control municipalities. An 
important step in that direction is to know what makes treated municipalities different from 
non-treated, in order to avoid that the estimated treatment effect captures influences on 
social capital other than that of political exclusion. Table 1 reports results of a mean 
comparison test between treated and non-treated municipalities for covariates before the 
treatment (1951) and in the present (2005). For this purpose a binary treatment is now used.18  
Treated municipalities have, on average, a significantly greater population size and 
urbanization rate in 1951 as well as in 2005. On the one hand, a larger population size may 
reflect a higher level of economic activity, but also the fact that individuals are more exposed 
to an unfamiliar environment (i.e. to treat with strangers). On the other hand, urbanization is 
likely related with the type of economic activities performed (treated municipalities have 
indeed a significantly lower share of the population in the agricultural and mining sector), 
                                                          
17 Central region (including Bogotá), Atlantic coast, Pacific-north, south-west, ‘Viejo Caldas’-Antioquia (region 
associated with coffee production in Colombia), and ‘Santanderes’ in the north-east (formed by two departments: 
Santander and Norte de Santander). 
18 A municipality is treated if political_exclusion is higher than 1%. 20 out of 57 municipalities are considered 
treated in Table 1, where the median value of political_exclusion is 0,09%. This value indicates the lowest positive 
electoral share of non-traditional parties, which means that 28 municipalities have no electoral share of these 
parties before the NF. Although this value would be a natural treatment threshold for the purposes in Table 1, I 
take a higher, more conservative threshold. 
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and may also be a measure of population density, both of which might be able to explain 
differences in social capital. Hence, I control for population size and urbanization rate in 
1951 and 2005, as well as for share of the population in the agricultural and mining sector in 
2005. 
Bigger and more urbanized municipalities considerably attract migrants from many regions 
in Colombia, and this fact could be the reason why these municipalities exhibit a greater 
dispersion of political preferences and lower levels of trust. Although the mean share of 
immigrants (including Colombians from other departments) is not significantly different 
between treated and non-treated municipalities, I control for the latter measure in the model.  
Additionally, treated and control municipalities significantly differ in employment rate in 
2005, schooling years of the population in 2005 and literacy rate in 1951. These variables can 
clearly affect social capital, but they can also reflect the population socio-economic level, 
which might be in turn an outcome of social capital in the past. I control for these three 
features as well.  
Whereas differences in municipalities´ development are important to explain social capital 
outcomes, I am also able to observe individual characteristics from the Barcas survey. 
Individual covariates used in the model are exogenous for answers measuring social capital, 
but can very likely explain differences in trust levels or perception of free-riding behaviors. 
Individuals in the sample that have been affected by the armed conflict in Colombia can be 
identified. They probably exhibit lower levels of trust given their particular experiences and 
this is captured by including a victim dummy variable. On the other hand, individuals 
belonging to ethnic minorities have a broader history of exclusion (not only from the political 
system) and are likely to share many cultural characteristics within their groups. Hence, I 
capture variation in social capital coming from these historical differences using dummy 
variables that indicate the membership to black ethnicity (black) or indigenous ethnicity 
(indigenous). 
Finally, region fixed effects defined in the previous subsection allow capturing any 
unobservable characteristics that are common within these regions, which are probably the 
outcome of the country´s historical development. In this sense, I can be more confident about 
the orthogonality of the treatment with respect to unobservable variables.  
A second condition for identification (or a particular case from the first condition) is that 
individuals with a specific level of social capital did not select into non-traditional parties. 
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Despite the above mentioned set of controls at the individual and the municipality level, we 
may still be concerned that individuals with a lower social capital selected into non-
traditional parties before the NF, and just because of cultural transmission we would observe 
worse social capital outcomes for treated municipalities today. In order to deal with this 
possibility, I would like to have a measure of social capital in the past or some observable 
that be an outcome of social capital. Following the literature19, a good proxy for social capital 
should be electoral turnout, since it is likely to reflect civism and cooperation among 
individuals in a society. Therefore, I extend the baseline model by adding mean electoral 
turnout at the municipality level before the NF (1941 -1947) as a regressor. 
3.3. Using electoral turnout as dependent variable 
Given electoral turnout as an indicator of social capital, I want to test if political exclusion 
implied by the NF affected the evolution of this variable. Electoral turnout at the department 
level in the period 1947–2006 (with gaps) is used in two alternative panel fixed effects 
models.  
With the first model I want to establish the average effect of the NF treatment and this model 
is given by: 
                                                                                  (2) 
where μd are department fixed effects, δt  are time fixed effects and postNFt . political_exclusiond 
is the interaction term between the treatment measure at the department level and a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one since 1974 onwards (i.e. the period after the NF). 
The second fixed effects model is described by:  
                       ∑                                                             (3) 
This model allows the estimation of the treatment effect for each year before and after the NF 
(d  are time dummies, where   is an index for every year except for one). This is meaningful 
in that now it is possible to observe pre-trends according to treatment level, although the 
effect of political exclusion should be only observed after the treatment. 
It is worth noting several advantages of the empirical setting proposed in this subsection. 
First, it allows capturing observed and unobserved characteristics that are time-invariant and 
specific to each department. It also captures the effect of other events in the recent country 
                                                          
19
 See Putnam (1995), Ostrom (2000), Fowler (2006). 
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history that may have affected electoral turnout in a given year within the time span used 
here. Foremost, the panel setting allows observing the timing of the political exclusion effect 
and what might have happened to social capital (as measured by electoral turnout) during 
the years right after the NF. 
 
4. Results 
 
Estimates for the baseline model are shown in columns (1) and (5) in Table 2.20 A higher 
political exclusion treatment, as measured by the mean electoral share of non-traditional 
parties before the NF, is significantly associated with lower levels of trust and with a higher 
perception of free-riding behaviors. To understand the magnitude of the coefficients, one can 
relate the estimated effect to a one-standard-deviation change in political_exclusion. 
Increasing the level of political_exclusion by one standard deviation reduces the probability 
that an individual trusts most people by 2 percentage points, or, equivalently, by 26% of one 
standard deviation in the trust variable. The same change in the treatment also increases the 
perception that others will take advantage by 38% of one standard deviation in the fair 
variable.  
I include the proxy for social capital before the NF (mean electoral turnout) in columns (2) 
and (6).  Now the treatment effect on the trust variable is no longer significant, while it is still 
significantly related with a higher perception of free-riding. Mean electoral turnout in the 
period before the treatment is not significant in either case.  
When performing these regressions using social capital outcomes aggregated at the 
municipality level, rather than at the individual level, in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8), results 
lead to the same conclusions as before. 
Table 3 reports estimates for the panel fixed effects models using electoral turnout at the 
department level as dependent variable. After controlling for time fixed effects, a higher 
political exclusion imposed by the NF is significantly associated with a lower average 
electoral turnout after the treatment (column (1)). 
                                                          
20
 Table 2 reports OLS estimates. Logit and ordered logit estimates in tables A1 and A2 (in the Appendix) confirm 
results presented here. 
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Graph 4 shows a corresponding picture. To allow for a graphic representation of the 
relationship, a binary treatment definition is used (department is treated if mean electoral 
share of non-traditional parties before the NF is higher than 0.5%)21. Electoral turnout is very 
similar among treated and non-treated departments before and during the NF, but for all the 
period after 1974 treated departments have always a clearly lower level of electoral 
participation (Graph 3 displays mean standardized turnout22 after the NF across 
departments in the Colombian map).  
Column (2) in Table 3 shows estimated coefficients for interaction terms between the 
treatment measure and year dummies, where the omitted interaction term is the one for 
1962. A higher mean electoral share of non-traditional parties before the NF is only 
significantly related to lower electoral turnout for years after the NF, namely, the period 1986 
-2002. Coefficients have a negative sign for all years after the treatment, but they are not 
statistically significant for the first three election years right after the NF. A simple intuition 
would tell that individuals were more willing to vote in the first election years for which 
alternative parties were allowed again to participate, and that this effect should have been 
stronger among departments with a higher treatment. This is clear in Graph 4 if I consider 
electoral turnout in 1974 (first elections with other parties). However, it is likely that the 
constitutional reform of 1968, which extended power sharing at some levels until 1986 (see 
footnote 9), made people feel their voting efforts were in vain. 
These results suggest that political exclusion imposed by the NF implied a deterioration of 
civic engagement and cooperation. In such a way, a negative association between political 
exclusion in the past and social capital in 2011, as reported by the estimates in Table 2, is 
more likely to be causally interpreted.  
4.1. Robustness checks  
I perform a placebo treatment in the baseline model by using the same measure of the 
treatment - mean electoral share of non-traditional parties - for the period 2002-2010        
(mean other 2002-2010).23 If there is something about the treatment measure that is related to 
                                                          
21
 0,5% is approximately the median value of mean electoral share of non-traditional parties in 1943-1951. 
22 The mean standardized turnout in a given department tells, on average for the period after the NF, by how 
many standard deviations (and in which direction) electoral turnout deviates from the mean electoral turnout in a 
given year. 
23 Only independent parties are taken as non-traditional, not the different ones that have emerged from the 
Liberal and Conservative parties. These independent parties comprise left-wing parties, minorities’ political 
movements and parties that have emerged to support independent candidates. 
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social capital and that I cannot observe, this measure today should be correlated with social 
capital.  
Table 4 and Table 5 show OLS estimates for trust and fair at the individual level, 
respectively.24 Columns (1) and (2) report again the baseline model results for comparison. 
Column (3) shows estimates using the placebo treatment and column (4) includes both the 
treatment and its measure today. For both dependent variables, the placebo treatment is not 
significant, and when including the treatment and its measure today, mean electoral share of 
non-traditional parties before the NF is equally significant, also similar in magnitude, while 
the same measure today is not. 
Migration during and after the NF treatment could be a concern, as it might dilute the 
observed effects or even lead to spurious correlations. I therefore estimate the different 
specifications in columns (1) - (4) using regressions weighted by the share of non-immigrants 
in each municipality in 2005.25 Results for these weighted regressions are shown in columns 
(5) - (8) of tables 4 and 5 and they lead to same conclusions as before: A higher political 
exclusion treatment is significantly associated with lower levels of social capital; the same 
measure of the treatment today is not related to social capital outcomes; and after controlling 
for a proxy of past social capital, political exclusion can still explain a higher perception of 
free-riding behaviors.26 
Finally, it is important to make municipalities comparable. Although I am already 
controlling for several observables at the individual and municipality level, as well as 
unobservables at the regional level, I would like to restrict the sample to more similar 
municipalities. I drop municipalities on the upper and lower end of the distributions for 
population and urbanization in 1951, so that I have the biggest sample possible with 
comparable municipalities. The 13 biggest capital cities have to be excluded, as well as the 15 
smallest and less urbanized municipalities. The third panel in Table 1 shows descriptive 
statistics for covariates in this restricted sample. Now differences in means are not 
statistically significant between treated and non-treated municipalities according to the 
binary treatment. 
                                                          
24 Logit and ordered logit estimates are shown in tables A1 and A2 and they lead to the same conclusions as the 
results presented here. 
25 Unfortunately, I am not able to know the year of migration of individuals born in Colombia. Thus, I am also 
including in immigrants those people who had already migrated before the NF. These are likely to be few in 2005. 
26 Table A3 and Table A4 in the Appendix show robustness checks with trust and fair aggregated at the 
municipality level, rather than at the individual level, as dependent variables. Results are now also robust to 
regressions weighted by the number of observations from the sample in each municipality (see columns (9)-(12) 
in those tables).   
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I perform again the regressions in columns (1) - (4) using the restricted sample and estimates 
are presented in columns (9) – (12) of tables 4 and 5.27 All previous results are robust to this 
smaller and more homogeneous sample, except for the placebo measure, which is now 
positively related to higher trust levels, while a larger political exclusion treatment is still 
significantly associated with lower social capital.   
 
5. Investigating the channel 
 
The hypothesized channel through which political exclusion about 50 years ago can 
explain social capital differences today is distrust towards the state. In that case, variation in 
political exclusion across regions should lead to a corresponding variation in this channel. To 
the extent that abstentionism reflects distrust towards the state, electoral turnout results 
presented in the previous section would support the idea that the NF had a differential 
effect, and that regions facing a higher political exclusion due to the NF are the ones with 
lower levels of trust towards the state after the treatment.   
I further investigate the proposed channel using direct measures of state perception from the 
Barcas social capital survey, namely corruption perception in public offices (corruption) and 
the perception that state’s decisions are not applied equally to everybody (all_equal). First, I 
want to establish if political exclusion affected these measures. I perform the same 
regressions as before, but now with state perception as dependent variable. Results for these 
regressions are shown in Table 6 at the individual and municipality level, as well as in Table 
7 (for corruption) and Table 8 (for all_equal) including robustness checks. They indicate that a 
higher political exclusion treatment is significantly associated with a higher perception that 
state’s decisions are not equally applied to everybody, although not after controlling for the 
proxy of past social capital. On the other hand, a higher NF treatment is in general not 
significantly related to higher corruption perception.  
Second, I want to verify the extent to which the treatment affects social capital through the 
suggested channel. For this purpose, I proceed in two steps. I first relate state perception 
measures with social capital outcomes (odd columns in tables 9 and 10), and next I include 
both, the channel and the political exclusion treatment, as explanatory variables for social 
                                                          
27 These results are confirmed by logit and ordered logit estimates in tables A1 and A2. 
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capital (even columns in tables 9 and 10).28 I have to note that for this part of the exercise I 
can only determine correlations between state perception and social capital, rather than 
causal relationships, as it is hard to establish if it is just because individuals have low levels 
of trust that they also distrust the state as any other agent, or if the reverse is true. 
Nevertheless, these correlations are reported here for the purpose of linking the channel to 
the outcomes. 
Table 9 reports a significant association (in the expected direction) between corruption 
perception and social capital outcomes. However, this evidence is not enough to support 
corruption perception as a channel, since this measure does not seem to be affected by the 
treatment (as shown in Table 7).  
Table 10 indicates that a higher perception that state’s decisions are not equally applied to 
everybody (all_equal) is related with a higher perception of free-riding behaviors, as well as 
with lower trust levels when using the restricted sample. This significant effect is in general 
also observed when including the political exclusion treatment, which is still significant 
(although lower in magnitude) to explain social capital outcomes. 
Whereas results for the all_equal variable may support the proposed channel in this paper, 
political exclusion seems to have an effect on social capital through other channels, as well.  
Alternatively, this can be evidence for the fact that state perception variables today cannot 
fully reflect state perception during and right after the treatment, which is the one argued to 
have undermined social capital. The latter could also explain why the treatment is not 
related in some cases to state perception measures today. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
        This paper gives evidence for Colombia that political inequality may be an important 
cause of low social capital, this measured by generalized trust levels and perception of free-
riding behaviors. I use an important institutional agreement in Colombia in order to test the 
effect of political exclusion on social capital. This was the National Front agreement, which 
for 16 years, between 1958 and 1974, established that political power could only be shared by 
the two traditional parties in that country. The National Front, although only a little part in 
                                                          
28 corruption is the explanatory variable of interest in Table 9 and all_equal in Table 10. See tables A5 and A6 for 
logit and ordered logit estimates. 
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the political inequality history in Colombia, gives the opportunity to test the effect of a 
formal institutionalized political exclusion that affected all regions in the country at the same 
time, even though with differential effects according to the initial political diversity in each 
region.  
Since this source of variation in the treatment is not likely exogenous for social capital, the 
empirical strategy seeks the identification of a causal effect of political exclusion. I find that 
the National Front treatment (defined as the mean electoral share of non-traditional parties 
in 1941-1951) is associated with less trusting individuals today and with a higher perception 
of free-riding behaviors.  
Additional evidence that political exclusion implied a deterioration of social capital is given 
by a decline in electoral turnout. Departments facing a higher political exclusion have, on 
average, a lower electoral turnout for all the period after the National Front and this negative 
association is only significant for years after the treatment. On the other hand, this finding 
also supports the idea that distrust towards the state may be a channel through which 
political exclusion in the past is able to explain social capital today. 
Using survey measures of state perception today, results indicate that a higher National 
Front treatment is in general associated with a higher perception that state’s decisions are not 
equally applied to everybody, and this, in turn, is associated with a higher perception of free-
riding behaviors.  
Political inequality may harm social capital, but can a low social capital explain the 
persistence of political inequality? In the following, I will sketch some possible explanations 
on why this could be the case. Distrust and free riding make elites more prone to work for 
their particular interests, as these features are also part of their values. A lower social capital, 
on the other hand, is likely to facilitate clientelism, as there are more citizens willing to do 
favors for money (sale their votes, accept bribes, etc.), and so they ease the persistence of 
corrupt individuals in power. Finally, distrust and free riding represent an obstacle for the 
society to converge into unified objectives and to demand socially optimal institutions. As a 
result, institutions may become even more dependent on the ruling elite. 
The idea behind this study implies that social capital responds to incentives and thus should 
not be understood as a country fixed endowment. Furthermore, this paper wants to provide 
an argument for the idea that formal institutions also matter through their effect on social 
capital, or more precisely in this case, that social capital may be an important channel 
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through which political inequality has been central for Colombian development. Therefore, 
this paper may contribute to the literature that examines how social capital is formed (or 
damaged), how political institutions are relevant for economic development, and to the 
literature on the persistence of culture and institutions. 
Further research on social capital in the context of developing countries is not only relevant 
for its potential direct effects on economic development, but it should be of interest given the 
extent to which it allows the persistence of other main causes of underdevelopment. Such an 
analysis would help to fill a gap in the range of development policies. 
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Figures and Tables  
 
 
 
 
Graph 1. Colombia - Mean electoral share of non-traditional   
parties 1941-1951 across municipalities in the sample. 
 
Notes: Circle size is proportional to (log) municipality population. 
Regions bordered with a thicker line are used for defining region fixed 
effects in the empirical strategy. 
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Graph 2. Colombia - Mean electoral share of non-traditional   
parties 1943-1951 across departments 
 
Notes: Mean electoral share of non-traditional parties before the NF 
was not available for San Andrés -archipelago not shown in the map-, 
Amazonas, Caquetá, Vaupés, Guainía and Vichada, as indicated in the 
map. Although it was not available for the Arauca, Casanare and 
Guaviare departments, either, this measure in their respective capital 
city is shown in order to cover all departments in the sample. These 
three departments are not included in Graph 4, nor in panel 
regressions presented in Table 3.  Regions bordered with a thicker line 
are used for defining region fixed effects in the empirical strategy. 
Graph 3. Colombia - Mean standardized electoral turnout                                    
1974 -2006 across departments* 
 
Notes: *Shows the mean value for the period 1974 – 2006 (after the NF) of 
the standardized turnout in each year (i.e. how many standard deviations 
does electoral turnout deviates from the mean electoral turnout in a 
given year).  Regions bordered with a thicker line are used for defining 
region fixed effects in the empirical strategy. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
Municipalities by treatment status 
 
 
Whole sample 
 
No treated 
 
Treated 
    
 
N mean sd 
 
N mean sd 
 
N mean sd 
            
            trust 37 0,121 0,077 
 
20 0,111 0,075 
 
57 0,118 0,076 
fair  37 5,619 1,313 
 
20 5,130 1,217 
 
57 5,448 1,291 
political_exclusion *** 37 0,001 0,003 
 
20 0,064 0,053 
 
57 0,023 0,043 
mean turnout 41-47 *** 35 0,496 0,112 
 
20 0,362 0,084 
 
55 0,447 0,121 
mean other 2002-2010 37 0,263 0,093 
 
20 0,295 0,102 
 
57 0,274 0,097 
all_equal 37 2,209 0,370  20 2,335 0,364  57 2,253 0,369 
corruption 37 3,177 0,253 
 
20 3,254 0,271 
 
57 3,204 0,259 
       Socio-economic variables 
black 37 0,028 0,086 
 
20 0,049 0,133 
 
57 0,035 0,104 
indigenous 37 0,019 0,045 
 
20 0,015 0,033 
 
57 0,018 0,041 
victim  37 0,319 0,197 
 
20 0,247 0,142 
 
57 0,294 0,181 
population2005 *** 37 71228,5 113405,8 
 
20 832589,1 1534596 
 
57 338372,5 970394,2 
urb2005 *** 37 0,570 0,209 
 
20 0,770 0,193 
 
57 0,640 0,223 
married2005 37 0,368 0,024 
 
20 0,364 0,030 
 
57 0,367 0,026 
ethnic2005 37 0,194 0,269 
 
20 0,196 0,253 
 
57 0,195 0,261 
literate2005  37 0,780 0,077 
 
20 0,825 0,096 
 
57 0,796 0,086 
employed2005 *** 37 0,948 0,025 
 
20 0,921 0,028 
 
57 0,939 0,029 
immig2005 37 0,175 0,136  20 0,177 0,086  57 0,176 0,120 
yrsimm2005 32 13,075 9,638 
 
19 15,355 1,022 
 
51 13,925 9,821 
schooling2005 *** 37 6,131 0,984 
 
20 7,540 1,138 
 
57 6,625 1,233 
agric2005 *** 37 0,429 0,228 
 
20 0,218 0,245 
 
57 0,355 0,253 
mining2005  37 0,008 0,014 
 
20 0,002 0,006 
 
57 0,006 0,012 
population51 *** 37 14787,4 23136,2 
 
20 118464,5 160644,2 
 
57 51165,3 107665,3 
urb51 *** 37 0,305 0,187 
 
20 0,648 0,284 
 
57 0,426 0,277 
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(Continuation) Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Municipalities by treatment status  
Whole sample 
 
No treated  Treated 
 
 
N mean sd  N mean sd  N mean sd 
literate51 *** 37 0,486 0,161 
 
20 0,645 0,158 
 
57 0,542 0,176 
immig51 35 0,154 0,173 
 
20 0,154 0,098 
 
55 0,154 0,149 
married51 35 0,201 0,065 
 
20 0,195 0,054 
 
55 0,199 0,061 
       Socio-economic variables in restricted sample 
black 21 0,025 0,057  8 0,105 0,203  29 0,047 0,118 
indigenous 21 0,014 0,044  8 0,032 0,049  29 0,019 0,045 
victim  21 0,349 0,155  8 0,316 0,150  29 0,340 0,152 
population2005  21 89668,8 120137,3  8 141153,5 123061,4  29 103871,5 121011,2 
urb2005  21 0,607 0,169  8 0,578 0,111  29 0,599 0,154 
married2005 21 0,372 0,024  8 0,352 0,046  29 0,366 0,032 
ethnic2005 21 0,169 0,282  8 0,351 0,329  29 0,219 0,301 
literate2005  21 0,784 0,081  8 0,755 0,097  29 0,776 0,085 
employed2005  21 0,944 0,029  8 0,925 0,032  29 0,939 0,030 
immig2005 21 0,154 0,119  8 0,136 0,053  29 0,149 0,104 
yrsimm2005 19 15,201 11,203  7 18,722 15,848  26 16,149 12,376 
schooling2005  21 6,352 0,929  8 6,631 0,840  29 6,429 0,900 
agric2005 21 0,366 0,233  8 0,372 0,252  29 0,367 0,234 
mining2005  21 0,006 0,014  8 0,004 0,009  29 0,006 0,013 
population51 21 17822,4 18388  8 25541,6 12085  29 19951,9 17039,8 
urb51 21 0,327 0,148  8 0,396 0,212  29 0,346 0,167 
literate51  21 0,455 0,173  8 0,518 0,137  29 0,472 0,164 
immig51 21 0,170 0,179  8 0,123 0,045  29 0,157 0,154 
married51 21 0,180 0,063  8 0,176 0,052  29 0,179 0,059 
Notes: Municipalities are divided into treatment and control group according to a binary 
treatment, which takes the value of one if mean electoral share of non-traditional parties is 
higher than 1% for the period 1941-1951. ***Difference in means between treated and non-
treated municipalities is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 2. OLS estimates at the individual and municipality level for social capital outcomes 
 
Notes: 
1 Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. 
2 Robust standard errors in brackets. 
All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity (2011), indigenous 
ethnicity (2011), victims of violence (2011), population size (1951 and 2005), share of urban population 
(1951 and 2005), literacy (1951), share of immigrants including Colombians from other departments 
(2005), employment rate (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture 
sector (2005) and share of the population in the mining sector (2005). 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
trust   fair 
 
Unit of observation: Individual1  Municipality2  Individual1  Municipality2 
   
 
 
(1) 
 
(2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
political_exclusion 
 
-0,463** -0,343  -0,349* -0,228  -11,377** -7,873**  -8,736** -8,884** 
[0,219] [0,253]  [0,200] [0,235]  [4,321] [3,786]  [3,742] [4,349] 
            
mean turnout 
1941-1947 
 0,045   0,063   2,386   -0,390 
 [0,106]   [0,125]   [1,756]   [1,670] 
 
           
Obs 2967 2901  57 55  2943 2871  57 55 
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Table 3. Panel fixed effects estimates for electoral turnout 
across Colombian departments as dependent variable. 
 
 
turnout 
 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
Coef. se 
 
Coef. se 
   
 
  
postNF_political_exclusion -0,745*** [0,265]  
  
   
 
  1947_ political_exclusion 
  
 
-0,509 [0,820] 
1966_ political_exclusion 
  
 
0,022 [0,613] 
1970_ political_exclusion 
  
 
-0,673 [0,606] 
1974_ political_exclusion 
  
 
-0,712 [0,606] 
1978_ political_exclusion 
  
 
-0,428 [0,606] 
1982_ political_exclusion 
  
 
-0,779 [0,606] 
1986_ political_exclusion 
  
 
-1,820*** [0,606] 
1991_ political_exclusion 
  
 
-1,184** [0,577] 
1994_ political_exclusion 
  
 
-0,977* [0,577] 
1998_ political_exclusion 
  
 
-0,995* [0,577] 
2002_ political_exclusion 
  
 
-1,246** [0,577] 
2006_ political_exclusion 
  
 
-0,911 [0,577] 
      
Obs 278  278 
Notes: 23 departments are used for these regressions since the treatment 
measure is not available for the remaining 9 Colombian departments. 
Both specifications include time fixed effects. The omitted interaction 
term is the one for 1962. ***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. *Statistically significant at the 
10% level. 
 
Graph 4. Mean electoral turnout among Colombian departments 
1947 – 2006 
 
Notes:  Vertical lines delimit the National Front period. This graph includes 23 
departments since the treatment measure is not available for the remaining 9 
Colombian departments. Treated departments by the National Front are 
defined in this graph as the ones with a mean electoral share of non-traditional 
parties higher than 0.5% (approximately the median) for the period 1943-1951.  
.3
.4
.5
.6
1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
year
all_ treated
non_treated
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Table 4. OLS regressions for trust as dependent variable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals 
with black ethnicity (2011), indigenous ethnicity (2011), victims of violence (2011), population size (1951 and 2005), share of urban 
population (1951 and 2005), literacy (1951), share of immigrants including Colombians from other departments (2005), employment 
rate (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005) and share of the population in the 
mining sector (2005). 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
trust 
 
No weights  Weighted by  non-immigrants  Without extreme observations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
  
   
   
   
   
   
political_exclusion 
 
-0,463** -0,343  -0,467**  -0,441** -0,340  -0,445** 
 
-0,622*** -0,413  -0,538** 
[0,219] [0,253]  [0,220]  [0,217] [0,251]  [0,216] 
 
[0,194] [0,299]  [0,206] 
mean turnout 
1941-1947 
 0,045     0,038   
 
 0,119   
 [0,106]     [0,107]   
 
 [0,134]   
mean other 
2002-2010 
  0,062 0,070    0,081 0,086 
 
  0,455*** 0,399*** 
  [0,119] [0,119]    [0,115] [0,114] 
 
  [0,081] [0,076] 
 
    
 
    
 
    
Obs 2967 2901 2967 2967  2967 2901 2967 2967  1181 1150 1181 1181 
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Table 5. OLS regressions for fair as dependent variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. 
All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity (2011), indigenous ethnicity (2011), victims of violence 
(2011), population size (1951 and 2005), share of urban population (1951 and 2005), literacy (1951), share of immigrants including Colombians 
from other departments (2005), employment rate (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005) 
and share of the population in the mining sector (2005). **Statistically significant at the 5% level. *Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
fair  
 
No weights  Weighted by   non-immigrants  Without extreme observations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
  
   
   
   
   
   
political_exclusion 
 
-11,377** -7,873**  -11,331**  -11,054** -7,793**  -11,032** 
 
-8,484** -10,132*  -8,957** 
[4,321] [3,786]  [4,309]  [4,236] [3,731]  [4,233] 
 
[3,546] [5,295]  [3,559] 
mean turnout 
1941-1947 
 2,386     2,235   
 
 -1,140   
 [1,756]     [1,731]   
 
 [2,785]   
mean other 
2002-2010 
  -0,832 -0,603    -0,586 -0,437 
 
  -1,278 -2,213 
  [2,308] [2,034]    [2,296] [2,053] 
 
  [2,393] [2,323] 
 
    
 
    
 
    
Obs 2943 2871 2943 2943  2943 2871 2943 2943  1173 1136 1173 1173 
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Table 6. OLS estimates at the individual and municipality level for state perception 
measures. 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
1 Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. 
2 Robust standard errors in brackets. 
Higher values for corruption and all_equal indicate a higher perception of corruption and that 
state´s decisions are not equally applied to everybody. 
All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity (2011), 
indigenous ethnicity (2011), victims of violence (2011), population size (1951 and 2005), share of 
urban population (1951 and 2005), literacy (1951), share of immigrants including Colombians 
from other departments (2005), employment rate (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the 
population in the agriculture sector (2005) and share of the population in the mining sector (2005). 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
corruption  
 
 all_equal 
 
Unit of observation: Individual
1  Municipality2  Individual1  Municipality2 
   
 
 
(1) 
 
(2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
political_exclusion 
 
1,668 1,928  1,360 1,748  2,090* 1,342  1,097 1,097 
[1,238] [1,434]  [1,680] [1,838]  [1,055] [0,982]  [1,069] [1,092] 
            
mean turnout 
1941-1947 
 0,169   0,286   -0,599   0,080 
 [0,503]   [0,604]   [0,593]   [0,741] 
 
           
Obs 2933 2861  57 55  2976 2905  57 55 
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Table 7. Ordered logit regressions for corruption as dependent variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with 
black ethnicity (2011), indigenous ethnicity (2011), victims of violence (2011), population size (1951 and 2005), share of urban 
population (1951 and 2005), literacy (1951), share of immigrants including Colombians from other departments (2005), employment 
rate (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005) and share of the population in the 
mining sector (2005). 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
 
Corruption 
 
No weights  Weighted by non-immigrants  Without extreme observations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
  
   
 
  
   
 
  
   
political_exclusion 
 
3,641 4,197  3,610 
 
4,031 4,622  4,020 
 
3,298 8,249**  3,576 
[2,968] [3,439]  [2,966] 
 
[3,080] [3,596]  [3,081] 
 
[2,138] [3,576]  [2,191] 
mean turnout 
1941-1947 
 0,393   
 
 0,437   
 
 3,136**   
 [1,174]   
 
 [1,201]   
 
 [1,336]   
mean other 
2002-2010 
  0,749 0,708 
 
  0,631 0,613 
 
  0,912 1,294** 
  [0,944] [0,860] 
 
  [0,962] [0,865] 
 
  [0,557] [0,660] 
 
    
 
    
 
    
Obs 2933 2861 2933 2933 
 
2933 2861 2933 2933 
 
1157 1120 1157 1157 
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Table 8. Ordered logit regressions for all_equal as dependent variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. 
Higher values for all_equal indicate a higher perception that state´s decisions are not equally applied to everybody. 
All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity (2011), indigenous ethnicity (2011), victims of 
violence (2011), population size (1951 and 2005), share of urban population (1951 and 2005), literacy (1951), share of immigrants including 
Colombians from other departments (2005), employment rate (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the 
agriculture sector (2005) and share of the population in the mining sector (2005). 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
all_equal 
 
No weights  Weighted  by non-immigrants  Without extreme observations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
  
   
   
   
   
   
political_exclusion 
 
5,473** 3,791  5,504** 
 
5,221* 3,504  5,248* 
 
4,948** 1,832  4,809* 
[2,712] [2,478]  [2,738] 
 
[2,863] [2,621]  [2,891] 
 
[2,393] [3,289]  [2,475] 
mean turnout 
1941-1947 
 -1,288   
 
 -1,322   
 
 -1,958   
 [1,470]   
 
 [1,526]   
 
 [1,474]   
mean other 
2002-2010 
  -0,216 -0,334 
 
  -0,373 -0,451 
 
  -1,128 -0,695 
  [1,137] [1,072] 
 
  [1,130] [1,072] 
 
  [1,200] [1,191] 
 
    
 
    
 
    
Obs 2976 2905 2976 2976  2976 2905 2976 2976  1176 1139 1176 1176 
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Table 9. OLS regressions for social capital outcomes – corruption as explanatory variable of interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity (2011), indigenous ethnicity 
(2011), victims of violence (2011), population size (1951 and 2005), share of urban population (1951 and 2005), literacy (1951), share of immigrants including Colombians from other 
departments (2005), employment rate (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005) and share of the population in the mining sector 
(2005).***Statistically significant at the 1% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. *Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
trust  fair 
 
No weights  
Weighted  by 
non-immigrants 
 
Without extreme 
observations 
 No weights  
Weighted  by 
non-immigrants 
 
Without extreme 
observations 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
 
m_corruption 
 
-0,068** -0,053*  -0,069** -0,054*  -0,122*** -0,094***  -2,167*** -1,810***  -2,111*** -1,754***  -2,332*** -1,943** 
[0,033] [0,031]  [0,032] [0,031]  [0,033] [0,030]  [0,705] [0,646]  [0,694] [0,635]  [0,762] [0,836] 
political_exclusion 
 
 
 -0,383**   -0,351*   -0,531***   -8,461***   -7,958***   -6,361* 
 
[0,185] 
 
 
 
[0,182] 
 
 
 
[0,159] 
 
 
 
[2,889] 
 
 
 
[2,838] 
 
 
 
[3,338] 
 
Obs 2967 2967  2967 2967  1181 1181  2943 2943  2943 2943  1173 1173 
 
Table 10. OLS regressions for social capital outcomes – all_equal  as explanatory variable of interest. 
 
 
trust 
 
 
fair 
 
No weights  
Weighted  by 
non-immigrants 
 
Without extreme 
observations 
 No weights  
Weighted  by 
non-immigrants 
 
Without extreme 
observations 
 
(1) 
 
(2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
all_equal 
 
-0,014 -0,013  -0,014 -0,013  -0,033*** -0,031**  -0,317*** -0,282***  -0,336*** -0,302***  -0,269* -0,237 
[0,009] [0,010]  [0,009] [0,009]  [0,012] [0,012]  [0,102] [0,097]  [0,105] [0,099]  [0,148] [0,147] 
political_exclusion 
 
 -0,439*   -0,419*   -0,546***   -10,347**   -10,022**   -6,653* 
 [0,224]   [0,222]   [0,177]   [4,180]   [4,093]   [3,386] 
 
                 
Obs 2921 2921  2921 2921  1150 1150  2900 2900  2900 2900  1144 1144 
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Appendix 
 
 
Graph A1. Municipalities in the sample according to a binary  
treatment definition 
 
Notes: Treated municipalities in this graph are the ones with mean electoral 
share of non-traditional parties in 1941-1951 higher than 1%. Circle size is 
proportional to (log) municipality population. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
Graph A2. Mean trust at the municipal level 
 
Notes: Legend indicates the share of individuals who answered that 
most people can be trusted. Circle size is proportional to (log) 
municipality population. 
Graph A3.  Mean fair at the municipal level 
 
Notes: fair ranges from 1 (people take advantage) to 10 (people are 
fair).  Circle size is proportional to (log) municipality population. 
40 
 
                                                
Table A1. Logit regressions for trust as dependent variable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with 
black ethnicity (2011), indigenous ethnicity (2011), victims of violence (2011), population size (1951 and 2005), share of urban population 
(1951 and 2005), literacy (1951), share of immigrants including Colombians from other departments (2005), employment rate (2005), 
mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005) and share of the population in the mining sector 
(2005). 
 ***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
 
trust 
 
No weights  Weighted by  non-immigrants  Without extreme observations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
  
   
   
   
   
   
political_exclusion 
 
-7,448** -6,488  -7,516** 
 
-7,268** -6,540  -7,310** 
 
-6,731** -5,207  -5,930** 
[3,523] [4,185]  [3,611] 
 
[3,404] [4,112]  [3,500] 
 
[2,948] [4,142]  [2,826] 
mean turnout 
1941-1947 
 0,288   
 
 0,190   
 
 0,729   
 [1,181]   
 
 [1,174]   
 
 [1,443]   
mean other 
2002-2010 
  0,199 -0,169 
 
  0,321 -0,091 
 
  3,489*** 2,941*** 
  [0,966] [0,971] 
 
  [0,914] [0,917] 
 
  [0,807] [0,719] 
 
    
 
    
 
    
Obs 2967 2901 2967 2967  2967 2901 2967 2967  1181 1150 1181 1181 
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Table A2. Ordered logit regressions for fair as dependent variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. 
All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity (2011), indigenous ethnicity (2011), victims of violence 
(2011), population size (1951 and 2005), share of urban population (1951 and 2005), literacy (1951), share of immigrants including Colombians 
from other departments (2005), employment rate (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005) and 
share of the population in the mining sector (2005).  
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
fair 
 
No weights  Weighted by  non-immigrants  Without extreme observations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
  
   
   
   
   
   
political_exclusion 
 
-7,029*** -4,636**  -6,972*** 
 
-6,777*** -4,535**  -6,739*** 
 
-5,798** -6,577**  -6,203** 
[2,704] [2,214]  [2,691] 
 
[2,615] [2,157]  [2,611] 
 
[2,419] [3,226]  [2,448] 
mean turnout 
1941-1947 
 1,723   
 
 1,651   
 
 -0,582   
 [1,148]   
 
 [1,138]   
 
 [1,777]   
mean other 
2002-2010 
  -0,694 -0,454 
 
  -0,546 -0,350 
 
  -1,033 -1,714 
  [1,439] [1,312] 
 
  [1,425] [1,318] 
 
  [1,464] [1,469] 
 
    
 
    
 
    
Obs 2943 2871 2943 2943  2943 2871 2943 2943  1173 1136 1173 1173 
42 
 
 Table A3. OLS weighted and non-weighted regressions for mean trust at the municipality level as dependent variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in brackets. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, share of individuals with black ethnicity (2011), 
indigenous ethnicity (2011), share of victims of violence (2011), population size (1951 and 2005), share of urban population (1951 and 
2005), literacy (1951), share of immigrants including Colombians from other departments (2005), employment rate (2005), mean 
schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005) and share of the population in the mining sector (2005). 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
  
  
 
 
 
mean trust 
 
No weights  Weighted by non-immigrants  Weighted by observations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
  
   
   
   
   
   
political_exclusion 
 
-0,349* -0,228  -0,351* 
 
-0.344* -0,232  -0,346 
 
-0,429 * -0,361  -0,432* 
[0,200] [0,235]  [0,205] 
 
[0,202] [0,238]  [0,207] 
 
[0,244] [0,289]  [0,249] 
mean turnout 
1941-1947 
 0,063   
 
 0,061   
 
 0,009   
 [0,125]   
 
 [0,123]   
 
 [0,147]   
mean  other 
2002-2010 
  0,005 0,015 
 
  0,027 0,034 
 
  -0,005 0,017 
  [0,145] [0,149] 
 
  [0,139] [0,141] 
 
  [0,153] [0,156] 
 
    
 
    
 
    
Obs 57 55 57 57 
 
57 55 57 57 
 
57 55 57 57 
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Table A4. OLS weighted and non-weighted regressions for mean fair at the municipality level as dependent variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in brackets. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, share of individuals with black ethnicity (2011), 
indigenous ethnicity (2011), share of victims of violence (2011), population size (1951 and 2005), share of urban population (1951 and 2005), 
literacy (1951), share of immigrants including Colombians from other departments (2005), employment rate (2005), mean schooling years 
(2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005) and share of the population in the mining sector (2005).  
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
      
 
mean fair  
 
No weights  Weighted by non-immigrants  Weighted by observations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
  
   
   
   
   
   
political_exclusion 
 
-8,736** -8,884**  -8,514** 
 
-8,713** -8,952*  -8,573** 
 
-9,012** -7,844*  -8,618** 
[3,742] [4,349]  [3,631] 
 
[3,785] [4,441]  [3,725] 
 
[3,948] [4,313]  [3,930] 
mean turnout 
1941-1947 
 -0,390   
 
 -0,472   
 
 0,690   
 [1,670]   
 
 [1,622]   
 
 [1,937]   
mean other 
2002-2010 
  -2,346 -2,116 
 
  -2,018 -1,853 
 
  -2,395 -1,945 
  [2,629] [2,534] 
 
  [2,652] [2,588] 
 
  [2,642] [2,559] 
 
    
 
    
 
    
Obs 57 55 57 57 
 
57 55 57 57 
 
57 55 57 57 
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      Table A5. Logit|Ordered logit regressions for social capital outcomes – corruption as explanatory variable of interest. 
Notes: Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the municipality level. All specifications controlling for region fixed effects, individuals with black ethnicity (2011), indigenous ethnicity (2011), 
victims of violence (2011), population size (1951 and 2005), share of urban population (1951 and 2005), literacy (1951), share of immigrants including Colombians from other departments (2005), 
employment rate (2005), mean schooling years (2005), share of the population in the agriculture sector (2005) and share of the population in the mining sector (2005). ***Statistically significant 
at the 1% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. *Statistically significant at the 10% level.
 
 
trust  fair 
 
No weights 
 
 Weighted by 
  non-immigrants 
 Without extreme 
observations 
 No weights 
 
 Weighted by  
non-immigrants 
 Without extreme 
observations 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
 
m_corruption 
 
-0,945*** -0,810***  -0,982*** -0,843***  -1,496*** -1,227***  -1,297*** -1,070**  -1,249*** -1,022**  -1,433*** -1,158** 
[0,344] [0,307]  [0,322] [0,290]  [0,389] [0,286]  [0,462] [0,437]  [0,448] [0,421]  [0,519] [0,584] 
political_exclusion 
  
-6,563**   -6,266**   -5,870**  
 
-5,292***   -4,943***   -4,432* 
 
[3,061]   [2,945]   [2,319]  
 
[1,834]   [1,763]   [2,382] 
   
       
  
 
  
   
Obs 2967 2967  2967 2967  1181 1181  2943 2943  2943 2943  1173 1173 
 
Table A6.  Logit|Ordered logit regressions for social capital outcomes – all_equal  as explanatory variable of interest. 
 
 
trust 
 
 
fair 
 
No weights 
 
 Weighted by 
  non-immigrants 
 Without extreme 
observations 
 No weights 
 
 Weighted by 
non-immigrants 
 Without extreme 
observations 
 
(1) 
 
(2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
all_equal 
 
-0,147 -0,130 
 
-0,146 -0,130 
 
-0,283*** -0,259** 
 
-0,200*** -0,180*** 
 
-0,213*** -0,193*** 
 
-0,180** -0,163* 
[0,094] [0,096] 
 
[0,091] [0,093] 
 
[0,108] [0,108] 
 
[0,063] [0,060] 
 
[0,065] [0,061] 
 
[0,088] [0,088] 
political_exclusion 
 
 
-7,164** 
 
 -6,995** 
 
 -5,626** 
 
 
-6,375** 
 
 -6,124** 
 
 -4,669** 
 
[3,488] 
 
 [3,369] 
 
 [2,477] 
 
 
[2,633] 
 
 [2,546] 
 
 [2,366] 
   
       
  
 
  
   
Obs 2921 2921 
 
2921 2921 
 
1150 1150 
 
2900 2900 
 
2900 2900 
 
1144 1144 
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Table  A7. Variables description 
 
Variable   Description 
 
trust 
 
 
 
 
  
Generally speaking would you say most people can be trusted, or one cannot 
be that trusting when dealing with people? 
most people can be trusted 1 
one cannot be that trusting 0 
 
 
fair 
  
Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a 
chance, or would they try to be fair? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
people would try                                                        
to take advantage 
people would try                                              
to be fair 
 
 
political_exclusion 
  
Mean share of votes for non-traditional parties in total votes for Chamber 
elections in 1941, 1943, 1945, 1947, 1949 and 1951. Non-traditional parties are 
those different from the Liberal and Conservative parties. 
 
mean turnout 
1941-1947 
  
Mean share of total number of votes in electoral potential (individuals able to 
vote) for legislative elections in 1941, 1943, 1945, 1947. 
 
mean other         
2002-2010  
  
Mean share of votes for non-traditional parties in total votes for Chamber 
elections in 2002, 2006 and 2010. Only independent parties are taken as non-
traditional parties, not the different ones that have emerged from the Liberal 
and Conservative parties. These independent parties comprise left-wing 
parties, minorities’ political movements and parties that have emerged to 
support independent candidates. 
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Variable   Description 
corruption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 How common do you believe are bribes and corruption in this country? 
Almost no public official is involved in corruption 1 
Some public officials are involved in corruption 2 
The majority of public official are involved in 
corruption. 
3 
Almost every public official is involved in 
corruption 
4 
 
all_equal 
 
 
 
 
 
 Do you agree, disagree or neither agree or disagree with the following 
statement: When the state makes a decision, it is applied equally to 
everybody. 
Agree 1 
Neither agree or disagree 2 
Disagree 3 
 
 
black 
 
 
 
Individual reports to be from black ethnicity 1 
otherwise 0 
 
indigenous 
 
  
 Individual reports to be from indigenous ethnicity 1 
otherwise 0 
 
 
 
victim  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Individual gives an affirmative answer to any of the 
following questions: 
 Have you lost any member of your family or 
close relative because of the armed conflict?  
 Has any member of your family, or have you 
had to take refuge or to leave your home 
because of the armed conflict?  
 Has any member of your family had to leave 
the country because of the armed conflict? 
1 
otherwise 0 
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Variable  Description 
population2005  Municipality´s population in 2005  
urb2005  
 Share of individuals living in the urban area of the municipality in 
2005 
married2005  Share of married individuals in the municipality in 2005. 
ethnic2005 
 Share of individuals in the municipality that belong to black or 
indigenous ethnicities in 2005. 
literate2005   Share of literate individuals in the municipality in 2005. 
employed2005  
 Share of individuals with any type of employment among the 
economically active population in the municipality in 2005. 
immig2005 
 Share of individuals in 2005 in the municipality that were born in a 
different department or different country. 
yrsimm2005 
 Average number of years since migration among foreigners in the 
municipality in 2005. 
schooling2005 
 Average number of schooling years of the municipality´s population 
in 2005. 
agric2005  
 Share of individuals in the municipality working in the agricultural 
sector in 2005. 
mining2005  
 Share of individuals in the municipality working in the mining sector 
in 2005. 
population51  Municipality´s population in 1951. 
urb51  
 Share of individuals living in the urban area of the municipality in 
1951. 
literate51  Share of literate individuals in the municipality in 1951. 
immig51 
 Share of individuals in 1951 in the municipality that were born in a 
different department or different country.  
married51  Share of married individuals in the municipality in 1951. 
 
